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FOREWORD
Often, when a conference is over―it is over. More often than not,
attendees and presenters return to their normal duties thinking good or
ambivalent thoughts about what they heard and learned. At the same time,
there might be a fleeting moment―or two or three―when one wonders
how a particular set of ideas expressed at that conference might be
implemented. But, again, “the fat lady has sung her song,” and everyone
has resumed normal routines.
In the case of the conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War
College, U.S. Southern Command, and University of Miami NorthSouth Center held last March, entitled “Building Regional Security in
the Western Hemisphere,” we have generated a substantive set of issues
and recommendations. Dr. Max Manwaring and his team of conference
rapporteurs have reviewed hours of tapes and reams of notes to clarify
the issues and develop actionable recommendations. Interestingly, those
issues and recommendations correspond closely with Department of
Defense concerns expressed 2 years ago to help build mutual confidence
on hemispheric security issues. In these terms, the conference rapporteurs
have provided a viable means by which to begin the implementation of
serious hemispheric security cooperation. Additionally, we have included
U.S. Southern Command Commander General Hill’s conference luncheon
remarks as the Preface to our Issues and Recommendations report. The
intent is to provide more context for readers who might not have attended
the conference. We have also asked Ambassador Ambler Moss, the Director
of the North-South Center, to expand that context with a short Afterword.
This report comes at a critical juncture―a time of promise for greater
economic integration between the United States and Latin America, but
also a time of profound concern about the deteriorating security situation in
a number of countries in the region. The Strategic Studies Institute and the
North-South Center are pleased to offer these issues and recommendations
as part of our continuing effort to inform the debate and support the best
interests of the governments and peoples of our hemisphere.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

PREFACE
Today’s Western Hemisphere strategic environment is unique.
In stark contrast to many other parts of the world, countries in the
Western Hemisphere are not threatened militarily by their neighbors.
Twenty-five years ago, the vast majority of the governments in
Latin America and the Caribbean were under either communist or
autocratic rule. Today, every country in the hemisphere except one
is a democracy. Democracy is the goal and the accepted model for
government in the Western Hemisphere. This is significant because
democracies tend to look out for the welfare of their people, seek
positive relations with their neighbors, and, most importantly, do
not make war against each other.
When flare-ups have occurred in the Americas in the past decade,
they have been resolved by diplomacy and regional cooperation
rather than by force of arms. Contrary to popular myth, Latin
America is the least militarized region of the world, accounting for
only 4 percent of the world’s defense spending. The peace between
our nations should have translated into greater prosperity and more
security for the people of the Americas, but for some it has not. We
know that our hemisphere, like the entire world, has become a more
volatile and unpredictable place, and we’ve got a long way to go to
make it safe.
Today the threat to the countries of the region is not the military
force of the adjacent neighbor or some invading foreign power.
Today’s foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms trafficker,
the document forger, the international crime boss, and the money
launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown, and nurtured
in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers,
and unpopulated border areas. This threat is watered and fertilized
with money from drugs, illegal arms sales, and human trafficking.
This threat respects neither geographical nor moral boundaries.
Nowhere is the threat more graphically and brutally active than
in Colombia, where Latin America’s oldest democracy is under
attack by three narcoterrorist groups. These terrorists should not
be referred to as guerrillas, insurgents, or rebels because such
“romantic” labels imply some sort of legitimacy. There is nothing
v

romantic or legitimate about these narcoterrorists who wreak havoc
on Colombia and its people. On February 7, 2003, in Bogotá, a 200 kg
car bomb planted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) exploded in a parking garage under the 11-story El Nogal
social club, killing 35 people, including six children, and injuring
173 more at a piñata party. These are the same narcoterrorists who
employ homemade propane tank mortars with a range of 400 yards
and notorious inaccuracy. They do what they are meant to do: kill
indiscriminately. These are the narcoterrorists who kidnap and
then force unwitting victims to drive cars loaded with explosives,
which are then remotely detonated. These narcoterrorists conduct
incessant violent attacks to undermine the security and stability of
Colombia. They are incredibly well-financed by their involvement
in every aspect of drug cultivation and production, kidnapping, and
extortion. They have long since lost any ideological motivation they
once may have had. Today, they are motivated by money and power,
protecting and sustaining themselves through drug trafficking and
terror. They offer nothing of value to the state or people, no better
form of government, no liberation from an oppressive dictatorship.
They offer death and lawlessness.
Last year over 28,000 Colombians were murdered―13 times the
rate of the United States. More than 2,900 were kidnapped―including
many children. More than 450 Colombians lost their lives last year to
landmines, the vast majority due to mines laid by the narcoterrorists,
not the military. Some 1.5 million Colombians have been driven
from their homes, displaced by the war. There were more terrorist
attacks in Colombia alone last year than in all other nations of the
world combined. Colombia’s narcoterrorists supply most of the
cocaine and heroin consumed in the United States. Drugs kill more
than 19,000 Americans annually and are indirectly responsible for
another 55,000 deaths, according to the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. By statistical definition, these drugs are weapons of
mass destruction.
The facts: narcoterrorists and other armed illicit groups operate
in and out of southern Panama, northern Ecuador, northern Peru,
Bolivia, portions of Venezuela, and the tri-border area. They are
involved in kidnappings in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay.
They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil, Suriname, Guyana,
vi

Mexico, and Peru. They use the same routes and infrastructure
for drugs, arms, illegal aliens, and other illicit activities. There is
a huge and growing market for forced and illegal immigration
documents. Narcoterrorists and radical Islamic groups are feeding
this market. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in
the transit countries, transit nations become drug consumers as well.
Narcoterrorism fuels radical Islamic groups associated with Hamas,
Hizbollah, Al Gamaat, and others. These groups, operating out of the
tri-border area and other locales, generate millions of dollars through
drug and arms trafficking and other illicit activities. Simply put,
direct drug sales and money laundering fund worldwide terrorist
operations. The reality is that narcoterrorism is a pervasive force of
destruction that not only affects our region, but each and every one
of our countries―big or small, rich or poor, weak or powerful. This
is a battle that must be fought together. If the focus is exclusively on
Colombia, we risk pushing the problem into neighboring countries
that are struggling to govern and provide services in their own
territory.
Narcoterrorists and drug trafficking organizations have shown
considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations, tactics, and
locations in reaction to our combined efforts. If we are not as
flexible, if we are not as agile or as quick to anticipate and counter
these adjustments, we will find ourselves always one step behind,
with old or inaccurate intelligence, lunging at shadows, and we
will come away with incomplete results. That is why I believe we
need to reevaluate our armed forces, security forces, and collective
agreements in order to bring about increased coordination and
cooperation. I would never say that the day of traditional military
capability has passed, but it surely must evolve to remain relevant
and defeat the threats of the 21st century. We must have the courage
and confidence to honestly evaluate how our armed forces are
configured, trained, equipped, and, more importantly, how well
they communicate with and mutually support their sister services,
other security forces, and neighboring countries.
I see the imperative for coordination and cooperation on three
levels: joint cooperation between the branches of the armed forces
within each country; inter-institutional, between the armed forces
and the security forces; and international, between sovereign
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nations. The most basic level of cooperation and coordination
must be between the branches of the armed services themselves.
Joint capability entails information-sharing, planning, and training
between the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard.
When we train, plan, and operate together, we learn each other’s
terminology, doctrine, limitations, and capabilities, and we forge
a strong, seamless, combined arms force. I believe we slowly are
getting better in this area.
The next level must be between the military and the other
security forces such as the police and customs. In this area we have
a long way to go. Armed forces must, within their constitutional
and legal constraints, support and cooperate with law enforcement
agencies in combating drugs and other transitional threats. Where
the legal boundaries do not make sense, given the current threat,
they should engage in an honest dialogue with their democratically
elected leaders to determine if laws and restrictions need revision.
That is an essential discussion that takes place in a democracy, a
proper role for a military in support of a democracy.
The final level is between countries, and I believe that this
cooperation already is starting to take hold in the Western
Hemisphere. The 5th Defense Ministerial Conference of the
Americas held in Santiago in November 2002 emphasized the
“desire to strengthen the inter-institutional and intergovernmental
coordination . . . which permits the . . . preservation and stability of
peace.” Cooperation and coordination between nations are much
more complex than just communicating with each other. They
must be built on a foundation of mutual respect and trust, and they
must be mutually beneficial. Without these precepts, there is no
cooperation.
Working together in multilateral exercises and forming trust
through transparency are just a few of the confidence- and securitybuilding measures that have formed a structure for multilateral
security cooperation in the Americas. We must continue to build
upon this edifice with even more synthronization of effort. The U.S.
Government and U.S. Southern Command are currently working on
initiatives to do just that―not only to exercise together, but also to
operate together in order to shut down transnational threats.
I routinely visit military and civilian leaders throughout Latin
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America and the Caribbean. I talk with them about readdressing
the roles and missions of their armed forces to ensure they focus
on relevant 21st century threats, not those of the past. Our ideas
must look ahead in anticipation of what can be. We must transform
ourselves to meet these new threats, and we must develop new
ideas that will ensure multinational cooperation and coordination
to fight common enemies. We must act together to prevent the
continuing and increasingly corrosive spread of narcoterrorism and
its connections to international and transnational terrorists, arms,
drugs, and other insidious threats throughout the hemisphere. It is
no mean or simple task.

General James T. Hill
Commander
U.S. Southern Command
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BUILDING REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
KEY POINTS:
•

Generally, the conference dialogue stressed that building regional
security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is not a strictly
short-term unilateral or bilateral defense effort. Regional security
will result only from a long-term, cooperative, multilateral civilmilitary effort. A viable framework for success evolved from the
conference presentations and related discussions that clarifies
diverse issues, focuses the regional security debate, and generates
a number of potential action items. The results emphasize four
highly related needs and associated recommendations:
o The need to advance hemispheric understanding of the
security concerns of each country, and those that the region
as a whole faces (e.g., the internal and external threat(s) to
security).
o The need to develop multilateral, civil-military structures and
processes to identify and address threats in the contemporary
security environment.
o The need to foster expanded dialogue, consultations, and
cooperation for building consensus principles and concepts
for regional security cooperation.
o The need to adapt U.S. military efficacy to the contemporary
threat environment in the hemisphere at the strategic level.

•

Finally, these issues and associated recommendations demand
a carefully staffed and phased regional security plan of action,
with measurable short- and long-term objectives to validate its
planning and implementation. The basic directions for a regional
security plan, as identified at the Miami conference, are as
follows.
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INTRODUCTION
Stability and security in the Western Hemisphere are pivotal for
global security and prosperity. Yet, efforts to attain these objectives
through the old paradigm of United States political domination,
imposition of economic will, and the threat of military intervention
have produced little but unproductive insecurity, mistrust,
noncooperation, and instability. All the countries of the hemisphere
have vested national security interests in helping to reverse these
trends, and replace them with positive security, moderation,
cooperation, stability, and prosperity. Nevertheless, there is no
agreement on the threat, and no agreement on an ends-means-ways
strategy to achieve the common security-stability interests.
The devastating effects of the Colombian crisis, and its spillover
into the entire hemisphere, which produce terrorism, drug
trafficking, vigilantism, and refugee flows, have given rise to three
areas of consensus. First, there is a consensus that confrontation,
regardless of outcome, brings nothing but death, destruction,
waste of valuable human and material resources, and the possible
renewal of militarism. Thus, according to this argument, multilateral
cooperation, coordination, and trust-building are irrelevant. Second,
there is the perception that nonstate actors and other unconventional
destabilizers can be dealt with only by attacking the root causes of
instability―poverty, disease, overpopulation, and injustice. This
is an internal problem, moreover, that requires no cooperation
or coordination with other countries. Third, there is a growing
consensus that security and stability can be achieved only as a result
of a combination of political-economic, socio-psychological, and
military-police efforts aimed at both the root causes and the manmade causes of instability. Because of the porousness of international
borders and the vastness of internal “lawless areas” that are
unmercifully exploited by human destabilizers (e.g., transnational
narco-terrorists) throughout the hemisphere, there is a growing
realization that viable security, stability, and prosperity must begin
with a process of building strong cooperative relationships with
neighbors.
Thus, at present, the countries of the Western Hemisphere
continue to work toward regional interests―separately. A beginning
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point from which to achieve viable security and stability is an
examination of the issues and recommendations that were derived
from the Conference on “Building Regional Security Cooperation
in the Western Hemisphere.” Interestingly and importantly, these
issues and recommendations correspond closely with the ideas the
Department of Defense (DoD) first outlined nearly 2 years ago to
help build mutual confidence on security issues and develop longterm bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere. These
ideas seek to:
advance the region’s understanding of the security concerns
facing it, develop mechanisms for addressing these concerns, and
obtain consensus on common principles and concepts of security
to address emerging threats. The Department of Defense wants
to foster expanded dialogue and cooperation in an atmosphere
of mutual respect for sovereignty and understanding of diverse
points of view.1

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Issue A: The Need to Advance Regional Understanding of the
Security Concerns Facing Each Country Individually and the
Western Hemisphere as a Whole.
There was agreement on a strategic vision of peace, stability,
security, prosperity, and civil society for the entire Western
Hemisphere. At that point, however, consensus began to break
down. There was no agreement on the threat. As a consequence,
there could be no agreement on a unified ends-ways-means strategy
that could contribute directly to the achievement of the strategic
vision. The impasse regarding the threat resulted from differences
in levels of analysis. The traditional level of analysis defines
national security in narrowly military terms, generally involving
the protection of national sovereignty against external military
aggression. The more contemporary concept of security threat,
espoused by the majority of conference participants, goes beyond
conventional external aggression to encompass internal political,
economic, and social matters. This view emphasizes the protection
of national sovereignty against internal instability, with varying
4

degrees of concern regarding conventional external aggression.
Discussion. The impasse was further complicated by a general
reluctance to take the broadened definition of national security
to its logical conclusion, that is, to correspondingly broaden and
integrate roles of security forces (i.e., military and police forces) to
address internal sovereignty protection missions. In that connection,
Clausewitz reminds us that “the supreme, the most far-reaching
act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make
is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.”2
ISSUE A, then, must be broken into two closely related sub-issues:
(1) security threats, and (2) the political complexity and ambiguity of
contemporary conflict.
Sub-Issue A(1): Security Threats. Contemporary terrorism and
intrastate conflict are lineal descendants of the type of low-intensity
conflict seen in the Third World over the past 50 years. They are
prevalent and popular, in part, because rural and urban insurgencies
had some success in contributing to fundamental political change
during the Cold War. Further, as the means of causing shocking mass
destruction become less expensive and more available, dissidents
rely on these more asymmetric forms of violence to disrupt order
and impose their own self-seeking values on peoples, countries, and
the global community. However, it appears that narco-traffickers do
not have a political agenda in that same sense. They are interested in
ensuring the inability of governments to interfere with their freedom
of action. Realistically, that is also an imposition of values applied
with hostile intent. In either case, we are talking about war against
the state.
Discussion. Those who argue that instability and conflict―and
the employment of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in conflict―are the
result of poverty, injustice, corruption, overpopulation, and misery
may well be right. However, it is naïve to think that poverty crashed
a jet airliner into the World Trade Center. Evidence demonstrates
that it is individual men and women who commit terrorist acts when
a government or other symbol of power is perceived to be unable or
unwilling to deal with a perceived injustice. Thus, people are as much
causes of terrorism as any other type of destabilizer. In this context,
it is helpful to (a) understand the differences between “threat” and
“enemy.” After that, the next step in the process of understanding
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associated security concerns is to (b) outline a strategic security
initiative that leads to stability and full sovereignty. These are
conceptual and educational requirements.
Example. The consequences of the 1985 Colombian terrorist
attack on the national Supreme Court and the “assassination” of 11
of its justices provide a good example of the importance of defining
“threat” and “enemy.” That terrorist action generated much debate
in government and security offices, but little action. Lack of action
was the result of the inability to come to terms with the questions
of (1) whether or not this blatant act was a simple law-enforcement
problem or a serious national security issue, and (2) “What was
the threat?” There was no agreement because the threat was not
understood.
On the face of the problem, there was only the murder of 11
people. The perceived motive for the terrorist attack on the Supreme
Court was simply the “punishment of corrupt and indolent justices.”
Thus, from the outset, there was a legal question regarding whether
the enemy was vengeful terrorists or incompetent judges. The fact
that the murder of 11 Supreme Court justices caused a key national
institution to function even more slowly and less effectively than
usual was not considered relevant. Yet, the exacerbation of the
court’s inefficiency led to a further discrediting of the Colombian
judicial system. That led to the system’s inability to guarantee civil
rights, human rights, and personal liberties―and to a consequent
weakening of the state. In turn, the ripple-effect of the associated
internal violence began to spread beyond Colombia’s porous borders
into all five of the country’s neighbors.
The resultant internal and regional instability constituted a
closely related triple threat to the sovereignty of the state. First, that
terrorist act indirectly and directly exercised a pernicious effect on
Colombian democracy. Second, that attack eroded the ability of
the Colombian government to carry out its legitimizing functions.
Third, the spillover into Colombia’s neighbors provides proof to
ordinary people and to the global community that the government
cannot control its national territory. Thus, the terrorist punishment
of 11 justices contributed to a partial collapse of the Colombian state
and the compromise of its sovereignty―a serious national security
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issue.3
(a) Recommendations for Differentiating between “Threat”
and “Enemy”:
•

It is helpful to think of the consequences (i.e., some level
of violence) of instability as third-level threats to national
and international security.

•

Root causes (i.e., causes such as poverty, corruption, etc.)
of instability must be recognized as second-level threats.

•

The inability or unwillingness of governments to develop
long-term, holistic, and morally acceptable means to
maintain internal stability and development must be
understood as the first-level (i.e., most fundamental)
threat.

•

Another threat emerges at a fourth level that is both a
cause and a consequence of instability and violence.
That is, once a violent internal adversary becomes wellestablished, first-level reform and development efforts
aimed at second-level root causes would be important but
not sufficient to control or neutralize a third-level (e.g.,
terrorist) threat. That violent human foe can be finally
defeated only by carefully applied force.

•

The sum of the parts of an effective response equals:
o Recognition at the highest levels of a destabilizing
problem;
o A sure capability to coordinate political, economic,
social, and security objectives against root causes (i.e.,
threats) and human causes (i.e., enemies) of illegal
violence; but also,
o Application of appropriate and effective “hard” and
“soft” power against the self-appointed “terrorist”
exploiters of human misery―regardless of label.

An Example of “What is to be Done.” Contemporary
nontraditional war is not a kind of appendage―a lesser or limited
thing―to the comforting vision of conflict and “law enforcement.”
7

It is a great deal more. As long as opposition exists that is willing
to risk all to violently take down a government and establish its
own―or simply to control that government―there is war. This is a
zero-sum game in which there is only one winner. It is, thus, total.
In the novel, The Centurions, Jean Larteguy vividly captures the
difference between traditional warfare designed to achieve limited
political, economic, or territorial concessions and the totality of the
type of conflict we confront today. Larteguy also describes “What
is to be Done.” In doing so, he contrasts the French (i.e., traditional)
and the Viet Minh (i.e., total) methods of conflict:
It is difficult to explain exactly, but it is rather like [the card game]
bridge as compared to belote. When we [the French] make war,
we play belote with 32 cards in the pack. But the Viet Minh’s
game is bridge and they have 52 cards: 20 more than we do. Those
20 cards short will always prevent us from getting the better of
them. They’ve got nothing to do with traditional [military]
warfare, they’re marked with the sign of politics, propaganda,
faith, agrarian reform. . . . What’s biting [the French officer]? I
think he is beginning to realize that we’ve got to play with 52
cards and he doesn’t like it at all. . . . Those 20 extra cards aren’t
at all to his liking.4

(b) Recommendations for the Fulfillment of a Strategic Security
Initiative That Leads to Stability and Full Sovereignty. The
fulfillment of a strategic, holistic, and legitimate sovereign stability
imperative consists of (1) A military and intelligence capability to
provide an acceptable level of internal and external security; (2)
The ability to generate long-term social and economic capabilitybuilding; and, (3) The political competence to develop legitimate
governance.
1. Military and Intelligence Recommendations for the
Establishment and Maintenance of Security and Sovereignty
at the Strategic Level:
• Establish viable standards of order and the rule of
law―and freedom from intimidation and violence―
throughout the entire national territory (i.e., air-space,
urban and rural “lawless areas,” and maritime space).
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• Isolate terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations
from all sources of internal and external support.
• Establish programs to sustain life, relieve suffering,
and help regenerate the economy.
• Establish unified national intelligence capabilities
(with effective links to legitimate international
organizations) that include the collection, fusion, and
analysis of all sources of information.
• Make intelligence operations a dominant element of
strategy, operations, and tactics.
• Develop a morally acceptable interrogation capability
at the operational and tactical levels, as well as the
strategic level, to take full advantage of human
sources.
2. Socio-Economic Development Recommendations. In
the past, the world generally emphasized socio-economic
development under the assumption that security and political
development would follow. That has not happened. Coherent
long-term, multi-level, and multilateral security and political
measures must:
• Be instituted to create and strengthen human (social)
and physical (economic) infrastructure; and,
• Generate a technical, professional, and ethical climate
to maximize the ability of those competent and
legitimate structures to effectively provide individual
and collective well-being.
3. Recommendations Regarding The Development of
Legitimate Governance. An outside power or coalition of
powers is limited in what it can do to facilitate the establishment
of a level of security that will allow the development of
optimal, long-term, infrastructural underpinnings necessary
for achieving and maintaining a civil society and a sustainable
peace. Ultimately, governments must reform and strengthen
themselves. Nevertheless, effective help may be provided―
not by a proverbial “Santa Claus,” “Social Worker,” or “neo9

Colonial state”―but by a sincerely interested “Facilitator”
country. Multiple prescriptive points for a Facilitator to
consider would include:
•

The promulgation of internal legislation and programs
that:
o Resist violent solutions to internal destabilization
problems.
o Develop competent professional leaders.

•

o Fight corruption.

The development of national, regional, and
international strategies to ensure global investment in
multilateralism.

•

The generation of a set of related and enforceable,
rational, prioritized, and synchronized milestones (i.e.,
end-state planning) that will preclude piecemealing
and “adhocery.”

•

Helping to institutionalize those identified processes
for sustainable human and physical infrastructure
capability development.

•

The provision of periodic internal and external
evaluation.

•

Finally, the Facilitator must ensure that:
o All programs directly support the mutually-agreed
prescriptive vision of legitimate governance and
civil society; and
o Programs consistent with the end-state vision are
applied at all levels.

Conclusion: Whatever the causes, instability within a nationstate leads to a crisis of governance and a downward spiral into
violence, loss of de jure and de facto sovereignty, and failing and
failed state status. In the novel, The Constant Gardner, author John
LeCarré vividly and succinctly captures that linkage. He answers the
question of “When is a state not a state?” from the point of view of a
10

commonsense practitioner:
I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, the
qualifications for being a civilized state amount to―electoral
suffrage, ah―protection of life and property―um, justice,
health and education for all, at least to a certain level―then the
maintenance of a sound administrative infrastructure―and roads,
transport, drains, et cetera―and―what else is there?―ah yes, the
equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails to deliver on at least a
quorum of the above―then one has to say the contract between
the state and citizen begins to look pretty shaky―and if it fails on
all of the above, then it’s a failed state, as we say these days.5

Sub-Issue A(2): Political Complexity and Ambiguity of
Contemporary Conflict. The political complexity and ambiguity of
contemporary stability and counterterrorist operations stems from
competing dynamics. Internal conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan,
Colombia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in the world
today, are the result of strong political motivation and extreme
supportive actions on the part of “rogues” and/or nonstate actors.
Concurrently, an array of national and international governmental,
military, and private organizations are engaged in a broad political,
economic, informational, and military/police effort to bring viable
governments, peace, and stability to those peoples. Understanding
and working effectively in this complex environment depends
on mind-set adjustments that will allow leaders at all levels to be
comfortable with the political ambiguity of competing interests and
diverse, legitimate policymakers in a long-term synergistic multiagency and multinational process.
Discussion. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the
fact that achieving contemporary security/stability―at whatever
level―is at its base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic,
psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to
change from a singular military approach to a multidimensional,
multiorganizational, multicultural, and multinational paradigm.
Thus, the political complexity and ambiguity issue dominates
contemporary responses to man-made disasters at least at two
related levels: (a) leader development, and (b) development of a
total unity of effort.

11

Example of the Need for Civilian and Military Leaders Who
Can Deal with the Political Complexity of Contemporary Conflict.
During the height of the terrorist assault on the Italian state in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, civil and military leaders understood that
the strength of a terrorist program is nourished by the alienation of
the governed from the government. Great care was taken to ensure
that leaders at all levels were sensitive and accommodating to the
general population while in the process of finding and dealing
with the terrorists. Thus, the planning and implementation of the
response to terrorism would have to be a completely coordinated
and unified effort, and it absolutely could not be a “dirty war.”
Together, these unifying and legitimizing efforts would reestablish
the kind of stability that was derived from popular perceptions that
the authority of the state was genuine and effective, and that it used
morally correct means for reasonable and fair purposes.
In these terms, the “enemy” would have to be very carefully
discerned and politically isolated from the rest of the Italian
population. This would require exceptionally prudent use of power.
The blunt force of regular military formations supported by tanks
and aircraft would be counterproductive. The more subtle use of
“soft” power, supported by information warfare, careful intelligence
work, and surgical precision in removing specific individual
terrorists from the general populace would be imperative. Moreover,
it would require an almost unheard of governmental unity of effort
to coordinate the multidimensional paradigm necessary for success
against the Italian terrorists.
The paramilitary carabinieri understand how to plan and
coordinate prudent surgical actions, and have the full police
power throughout the Italian national territory. As an emergency
national security measure, the government created a temporary
counterterrorism task force composed of state police, bank
and currency security, and carabinieri personnel―supported
unobtrusively by the regular Italian armed forces. This organization
was headed by the late carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto Dalla
Chiesa. He took the responsibility for unifying all intelligence
collection and counterterrorist operations. Once this decision was
implemented, long-term and short-term mutually supportive
objectives were determined and pursued, and terrorism was brought
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under control within 2 years.6
(a) Recommendations for Leader Development. Political
complexity and ambiguity can be seen in several ways. The ambiguous
multidimensional political-economic-psychological-moral nature of
contemporary conflict situations forces the redefinition of long-used
terms. In this connection, civilian and military leader development
at all levels must lead to an understanding that:
•

The enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military
entity or an industrial capability to make traditional war.
The enemy is also the individual political actor that plans
and implements illegal violence, and exploits the causes
of violence for his own nefarious purposes. Additionally,
the enemy is now also recognized as poverty, disease,
and other destabilizers that must be dealt with early and
holistically.

•

Power is no longer confined to combat firepower directed
at a uniformed enemy military formation or industrial
complex. Power is multilevel, consisting of coordinated
political, psychological, moral, informational, economic,
social, military, and police activity that can be brought to
bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators
of illegal violence.

•

Victory or success is not an unconditional surrender
marked by a formally signed document terminating a
conflict. In the absence of an easily identifiable human foe to
attack and destroy, there is no specific territory to take and
hold, no single credible government or political actor with
which to deal, no guarantee that any agreement between
or among contending authorities will be honored, and no
specific rules to guide leadership in a given “engagement”
process. Victory, perhaps with an international impetus,
is now more and more defined as the achievement of a
sustainable peace. Those who would declare victory and
go home before achieving a sustainable peace must be
prepared to return and deal with the problem again―and
again.
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•

Conflict is no longer a military-to-military war of attrition.
Conflict now involves entire populations. It now involves
a large number of national civilian and military agencies,
external national civilian organizations, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
subnational indigenous actors, all dealing one way or
another with a myriad of threats to security, peace, and
well-being. Thus, conflict is not only multidimensional,
but also multiorganizational.

•

Finally, contemporary conflict situations, whether they be
social or political, are not limited; they are total. Conflict
is not a kind of appendage―a lesser or limited thing―to
the development or disruption of well-being. As long as
destabilizers (e.g., poverty, disease, etc.) exist that can
lead to the destruction of a people, a society, and/or
government―there is conflict. These destabilizers are as
detrimental as human opposition willing to risk everything
to take down violently a government, destroy a society, or
cause great harm to a society.

An Example of an Integrated Force That Can Achieve Political
and Psychological As Well As Military Objectives. An example
of a military organization capable of rapid and decisive actions
designed to achieve political, psychological, and military objectives
is found in the Philippines during the period 1946-54. The first phase
of the Philippine government effort against the Huk insurgents,
1946-50, was marked by a reliance on military force and state terror
conducted by the generally corrupt Philippine Constabulary. That
effort had come to an unsuccessful impasse by late 1950.
The turning point in the counterinsurgency came with the
appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National
Defense. About the same time, President Harry S Truman asked
Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale to act as Magsaysay’s
U.S. advisor. Magsaysay and Lansdale understood the futility of
state terrorism and corruption. They also understood that killing xnumber of insurgents, militarily taking x-number of specific pieces
of territory, or destroying x-number of enemy installations was
irrelevant. Magsaysay did not engage in a simple war of attrition
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in the classical sense of destroying the enemy force. Magsaysay’s
offensive was against the political and psychological underpinnings
of the insurgents. He attacked the argument that the Philippine
government was totally corrupt and could and would not respond
to ordinary people’s needs.
Given a free hand to deal with the rebels as he saw fit, Magsaysay
drastically reduced the size of the Constabulary, began cleaning
up all the armed forces, gave the counterinsurgency mission to
the Army, and started schools to train officers in intelligence,
psychological operations, and civil affairs work. He then assigned
civil affairs officers to units to help solve peasants’ problems. He
demanded that all civilians, including suspected Huks, be treated
as well as possible and took disciplinary action against officers and
men who unnecessarily manhandled anyone. Information from
local people, informant nets, interrogations, and patrols increased
measurably. Exploitation operations to include psychological
operations and civic action based on intelligence gathered at the
operational and tactical levels during civic action operations brought
the Huk insurgency to the “banditry” level by 1954. It took over 30
years and a morally bankrupt regime headed by Ferdinand Marcos
to return the political-moral-psychological legitimacy rationale to
the “revolutionaries.”7
(b) Recommendations for the Educational Solutions to Unity
of Effort. At a minimum, there are six educational and cultural
imperatives to modify traditional war and ethno-centric mindsets, and to develop the leader judgment needed to deal effectively
with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural contingencies:
•

Attune civil-military leaders to cope with the many ways
that political and psychological considerations affect the
use and nonuse of force.

•

Attune leaders to understand that the number of battlefield
victories or the number of enemies arrested or killed has
meaning only to the extent that such actions contribute
directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state.

•

Teach leaders how to communicate with a diversity of
national and external civil-military cultures.
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•

Teach leaders how to cooperatively and collegially plan
and implement an operation employing a full complex
of diverse organizations―internal agencies, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.

•

Teach leaders a thinking process and an understanding of
grand strategy that will allow them to be clear on what the
situation is and what it is not.

•

Because nonstate actors in a conflict situation are likely to
have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional
and unconventional weaponry, teach/train leaders,
soldiers, and police involved in peace-enforcement and
stability operations to be effective warfighters.

Conclusion. Meeting the extraordinary challenges explicit and
implicit in the recommendations outlined above will not be easy.
It will, however, be far less demanding and costly in political,
military, and monetary terms than continuing a singular crisis
management and essentially military approach to regional security
that is inherently a strategic socio-political problem. Clausewitz’s
translator, Michael Howard, reminds us that “if [the socio-political
struggle] is not conducted with skill and based on a realistic analysis . . .
no amount of operational expertise, logistical back-up, or technical
know-how could possibly help.”8
Issue B: The Need to Develop Mechanisms to Address Threats in
the Contemporary Security Environment.
Conference participants perceived that the United States is
prepared to go its own way in the War on Terrorism (WOT), and
deal militarily with selected terrorist groups and rogue states. It was
also perceived that the United States has been oblivious to the more
elusive nonmilitary problems that spawn illegal drug trafficking,
terrorism, and myriad other destabilizing actions that lead to more
violence, crime, corruption, and conflict. The articulation of this
perception reawakened the long-standing Latin American juridicalpolitical bias that tends to reject U.S. domination―and solutions―
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anywhere. Thus, there were two sticking points in the discussions
regarding what the United States and the region can do cooperatively
to deal with the WOT. They are the questions of who decides who
is a terrorist; and who decides how to deal with that terrorist.
Consensus was that, at present, the answers to these questions are
determined ad hoc and unilaterally by the United States―and that
is unacceptable. Thus, the countries of the hemisphere continue to
address common problems separately.
Participants agreed, however, that because success against the
terrorist and related threats requires close unilateral and multilateral
civil-military coordination for an effective unity of effort, the only
viable approach to hemispheric stability and security is to devolve
the responsibility to the Organization of American States (OAS).
Discussion. Devolving that responsibility to the OAS,
nevertheless, does not absolve each sovereign nation of its inherent
responsibility and obligation to provide for its own security. The
OAS can provide only a moral position and structural framework
from which members states can operate together when necessary
and separately when desired. This takes us back to the problem of
“unity of effort.” The educational component of unity of effort has
already been noted. As a result, recommendations will focus on:
(a) conceptual requirements; (b) a conceptual and organizational
requirement; and (c) organizational requirements.
Unity of Effort and Strategic Clarity: An Example. In the past,
small-scale peace and stability operations tended to be unrealistically
viewed as providing military solutions to military problems.
Presently, the complex realities of these kinds of missions must be
understood as a holistic process that relies on various civilian and
military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated
fashion. The intent is to achieve a common political end.
In the reality of the Balkan experiences, early U.S. military
coordination during the assessment and plan development phases
did not take place with key U.S. civilian organizations, international
organizations, coalition partners, or nongovernmental organizations.
Later, planning and implementing procedures broke down in the
face of competing national interests and institutional agendas, and
segregated planning and implementing processes. Moreover, ad
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hoc reaction to changing conditions and “mission creep” became
the norm in the absence of a single overarching political-military
campaign plan. As a result, there was no strategic clarity, little if any
unity of effort, and very limited effectiveness.
A former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General John R.
Galvin, USA (Ret.), argues that continuous and cooperative planning
among and between national and international civilian and military
organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment of a given
situation, can establish a mechanism for developing a common vision
for ultimate political success (i.e., strategic clarity). Then, shared
goals and objectives, a broad understanding of what must be done or
not done or changed, and a common understanding of possibilities
and constraints will generate an overarching campaign plan that
becomes the basis for developing subordinate plans making direct
contributions to the achievement of the desired end-state. Thus,
the roles and missions of the various national and international
civilian and military elements evolve deliberately―rather than as an
ad hoc response to the crisis of the moment. Importantly, all these
integrative efforts ultimately ensure the conditions that will allow a
host nation or a guiding institution to develop or renew its political
solvency and legitimacy―and that a given mandate for peace and
stability will, in fact, be achieved.9
(a) Conceptual Requirements. It must be remembered that:
• The United States is not the only political actor in the global
or hemispheric security arena, and it is not the only player.
Sometimes it is not a player at all (e.g., in more specific
smaller-scale contingency or stability operations).
• There is a bewildering array of U.S. civilian and military
agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations, as well as “coalition” and host country
government civilian and military organizations, responding
to complex emergencies, such as that in Colombia.
• For any degree of success toward providing the foundations
of a sustainable peace, involvement must be understood as
a holistic process that relies on various civilian and military
agencies and institutions working together in a synergistic
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manner (i.e., U.S., host country, international organizations,
etc.).
(b) A Conceptual/Organizational Requirement. Before rushing
to create the architecture to deal with the security and stability
threats that have meaning for us all,
•

At the highest level, the primary parties must be in general
agreement with regard to the threats, end-state, and
associated set of operations to achieve the political vision.
And, although such an agreement regarding a strategic or
operational end-state is a necessary condition for effective
partnership, it is not sufficient. The agreement must be
supported by an organizational structure that can identify,
plan, and implement a plan of action. The structure has
several organizational requirements, as follows:

(c) Organizational Requirements.
•

An executive-level management structure which can and
will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution
of policy among and between the primary internal players
is required. The OAS can provide such a structure. That
structure must also be capable of continuous cooperative
planning and execution of policy among and between
primary external actors (i.e., primary external ally, other
coalition partners, international organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations).

•

That same structure must also ensure that all politicaleconomic-military action at the operational and tactical
levels directly contributes to the achievement of the
mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This
requirement reflects a need to develop an effective endstate planning mechanism within the executive-level
management structure.

•

End-state planning is an ends, ways, and means
methodology implied by Clausewitz’s admonition to
become involved in a conflict situation only when one
is clear about what one intends to achieve. The approach
allows the organizational leadership to:
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o Think logically, in synchronized small phases, about
the conditions one seeks to create;
o Synchronize the utilization of appropriate national
and international hard and soft civil-military tools of
power for each phase of the effort; and,
o Ensure that every civil-military effort contributes
directly to the achievement of the ultimate political
objective (i.e., end-state).
•

Even though the United States will not be the only player
in achieving hemispheric security, it is the most powerful
and influential actor. Thus, steps must be taken to ensure
clarity, unity, and effectiveness by integrating U.S. politicalmilitary planning and implementing processes with
hemispheric coalition government and nongovernmental
agencies and international organizations (i.e., through the
OAS).

Conclusions: The common denominator of the security dialogue
in the Western Hemisphere is the underlying issue of national,
regional, and international instability. Solutions to instability
caused by violent nonstate and transnational actors must consider
the transnational effects of these destabilizing activities, and the
concurrent requirement for comprehensive, transnational structures
involving the armed forces, police, and civilian instruments of
national power of the affected societies. The individual countries of
the region as well as the OAS face a challenge to change perspectives
from working together, separately to working together, collectively.
Issue C: The Need to Foster Expanded Dialogue, Consultations,
and Cooperation for Building Consensus Principles and Concepts
for Regional Security Cooperation.
Conference participants agreed that a beginning point from
which to achieve security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere
is for the United States to become more of a partner and less of the
proverbial “Colossus of the North.”
Discussion. In that connection, it was argued that if the United
20

States wants to enhance the hemispheric trade that exceeds that of
Europe and Japan and develop serious cooperation with three of the
largest economies in the world (i.e., Canada, Brazil, and Mexico);
if the United States wants sustainable economic development
and prosperity in the region and a viable Free Trade Areas of the
Americas (FTAA); and if the United States wants democracy and
human rights as a basis for the peace and civil societies in the
Americas―then the United States must become collegially involved
in a strategy for stability in the region. That, in turn, requires an
investment in multilateralism.
Examples. Ambassador Robert Komer has pointed out that lack
of unity of effort was a major deficiency in the Vietnam War.10 This
was also the case at the Bay of Pigs (Cuba) in 1961; Aden, 1968; the
Spanish experience in the Western Sahara, 1975-76; and subsequent
actions in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.11
On the positive side of the unity of effort dimension―with the
exception of the 1968 fiasco in Aden―British experiences seem to
dominate as good examples. Normally, an overall coordinator for
all military and civil activities is appointed by the prime minister.
A committee of the cabinet provides periodic direction, support,
and oversight for this individual. The coordinator may hold other
appointments, and has been known to the flag officer commanding
the armed forces involved in a given conflict―as was the case in
the Falklands War in 1982. He may even be the appointed head of
government―as was the case when General Templer in Malaysia and
Field Marshall Lord Harding in Cyprus performed the “coordinator”
tasks.
But regardless of other positions, the purpose of the “director
of operations” or “coordinator” is to act as the executive officer
of the supreme national body (i.e., Parliament). In this context, it
is assumed that he or she has the authority to deal with relevant
officials in the British government and with responsible individuals
in the supported (i.e., host) country. Together, long- and shortterm mutually supportive objectives―and ways and means―are
determined and pursued.12
Recommendations. A low-cost but high yield investment in
the Western Hemisphere for the United States would include the
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following core elements:
•

Continued and enhanced multilateral dialogues (i.e.,
conferences, roundtables, and workshops) that will build
upon mutually rewarding relationships and contribute
to the strategic thought undergirding U.S. and regional
security policy and strategy. Collaboration like this, with
a healthy exchange of ideas, is an excellent example of
the strength and potential of sovereign and regional civilmilitary relations.

•

Development of a guiding conceptual blueprint (i.e.,
strategic paradigm) for hemispheric stability and security
that will put the “levels of analysis” debate to rest. That is,
establish the complex linkages clearly demonstrating that
without legitimized stability there can be no effective rule
of law, judicial system, and human rights; no sustained
economic development and prosperity; no effective
democratic processes; and no durable peace.

•

Development of relevant doctrine for providing
standardized civil-military direction and guidance for
multilateral (i.e., coalitional) counterterrorist and stability
efforts.

•

Generate understanding at the highest levels that
addressing conflict situations solely through military
training, military equipment, and associated funding has
been proven ineffective in that it does not address the basic
causes of conflict, and thus becomes reactionary instead
of proactive. To accomplish the central strategic task of
regaining control of lawless territories and enforcing the
rule of law in a civil society, two fundamental efforts must
be undertaken:
o First, security organizations and their leaders must be
professionalized and upgraded to the point where they
can continually, effectively, and fairly enforce the law
on land, in the maritime areas, and in the national air
space; and,
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o Second, security organizations (i.e., police and military)
must be professionalized and upgraded to the point
where they can neutralize or control the perpetrators
of violence―regardless of label.
Conclusion: The United States shares with its hemispheric
neighbors an increasingly and vitally important financial,
commercial, and security/stability stake in the political and
economic growth of the region. Any kind of political-economicsocial-security deterioration in the area will profoundly degrade the
health of the U.S. economy―and therefore, the concomitant power
to act in the global security arena. The continuing U.S. responsibility
to the region goes beyond the narrow purview of unilateral military
training and equipping to broader multilateral strategy and leader
development.
Issue D: The Need to Adapt U.S. Military Efficacy to the Strategic
Threat Environment in the Hemisphere.
This fourth issue and associated recommendations concern
the strategic application of U.S. military power in the Western
Hemisphere. In that context, another major theme of the conference
is that the central strategic task of regaining control of lawless
territories and enforcing the rule of law in a civil society goes
beyond the narrow purview of training and equipping units. It
extends to broader multilateral civil-military education and leader
development.
Discussion. At the outset, it should be noted that the ultimate
responsibility for stability and security cooperation in the
hemisphere lies with the democratic governments of the region.
Yet, conference participants agreed that the United States, as the
crucial interested outside actor, has indispensable experience,
resources, and political influence. In teacher, mentor, and role model
terms, U.S.military forces can act as a major positive influence for
enhancing and strengthening hemispheric security at the strategic
level. For greater clarity, these recommendations are divided into:
(a) Primary Recommendations; (b) Intermediate Recommendations;
and (c) Advanced Recommendations.
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Example. Solutions to the problem of military efficacy take
the United States beyond unilateral training and equipping units
for conducting aggressive operations against a terrorist-insurgent
“enemy” to multilateral approaches to broader professional
military education and leader development. The accomplishment
of the central strategic task of regaining control of lawless territories
and enforcing the rule of law in a civil society requires that two
fundamental efforts be undertaken. First, security organizations (i.e.,
the military and the police) and their leaders must be professionalized
and upgraded to the point where they can enforce the law effectively
and fairly. Second, security organizations must be professionalized
and upgraded to the point where they can neutralize or control the
perpetrators of violence―regardless of label.
Primary principles derived from previous experience are, first,
that military force should not be applied ad hoc in response to either
political or military failure, or in an attempt to do “something that
might work.” If a foreign military force must be inserted into a
nationalistic milieu, it should be done overwhelmingly at the outset.
Examples would include the successful U.S. interventions in Lebanon
in 1958, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989. Nevertheless, the data
indicate that the best possible use of foreign military personnel in a
contemporary small-scale contingency is probably one variation or
another on the “train the trainer” role. Successful examples of this
type of effort would include U.S. Military Training Teams (MTTs)
training the first Cazador (hunter) units of the Venezuelan Army
to be first-rate organizations during the period 1961-64; and the
Bolivian Ranger units that destroyed Che Guevara’s organization in
Bolivia in 1968. This does not take many troops, they are in relatively
little physical danger, and they can keep a low political profile. Large
numbers of outsiders in a nationalistic environment for any length of
time have tended to be counterproductive in terms of undermining
the perceived “independence” of the host country, implicit host
acquiescence to “foreign interests,” and consequent weakening of
the “legitimacy” of the regime.
Second, accordingly, the “outside” forces that might be brought
into most contemporary situations do not necessarily need the skills
required for success against Industrial Age armies on the north
German plain or similar military formations operating in the open
24

desert. What they do need is a high degree of professionalism,
the ability to insert themselves unobtrusively into a nationalistic
environment, and the ability to help build and equip an indigenous
military force capable of finding and defeating an elusive and
dedicated enemy. This requirement takes us back to where we
began―back to the need to professionalize, modernize, and upgrade
indigenous leaders at all levels. Experience clearly demonstrates that
simply training and equipping troops have proven to be ineffective
reactions to the types of problems under discussion.13
(a) What the U.S. Military Can Do: The Primary Recommendations. The United States has had a great deal of experience and
success in training military forces to take the offensive against
enemies on the battlefield and in teaching armed forces how to
fight according to the humane considerations required under the
“just war” concept. The United States should continue to help train
and educate Colombian and other forces in these fundamentals.
Nevertheless, it was agreed that additional training and education
are also necessary. At the least, a carefully designed and relatively
modest assistance program could vastly increase the speed at
which military and police forces professionalize and modernize
themselves. A short list of the most important deficiencies and areas
for improvement in regional security forces would include:
•

Development of strategy.

•

Development of end-state planning capabilities.

•

Training and doctrine for joint and combined operations.

•

Improvement in the collection, fusion, evaluation, and
dissemination of usable and timely intelligence.

•

Development of quick-reaction capabilities.

•

Improvement in transport capability and lift.

(b) What the U.S. Military Can Do: Some Intermediate
Recommendations for U.S.-Monitored Professional Military
Education and Leader Development. Within this context, the study of
the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical
cornerstone for comprehending the essence of traditional war. It is
no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. As examples:
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•

Nontraditional national interests centering on “wellbeing” must be carefully defined and implemented.

•

The application of all the instruments of national and
international power―including the full integration of
legitimate civilian partners―as a part of a synergistic
security/stability process must be rethought and refined.

•

Information and intelligence must be understood as
force multipliers, and commanders at all levels must take
the responsibility for collecting and managing relevant
information for their own use.

•

The power of the interagency process, when used
correctly, and the impotence of unilateral actions must be
understood.

•

The notion of indirect engagement versus direct
involvement must be taught and applied.

•

Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of
tactical and operational actions must be understood and
appreciated.

•

The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to include
public opinion and leadership, must be taught and
applied.

•

The importance of learning how to defend one’s own
centers of gravity as well as attacking those of an
opponent―and the ultimate penalty for not doing so―
must be understood and applied.

•

The power of information and public diplomacy and the
penalties that are paid when these instruments of power
are not used, channeled, or harnessed must be rethought
and refined.

•

The fact that inaction can be as much of a threat to
stability and security as any other “destabilizer” must be
understood and internalized.

(c) What the U.S. Military Can Do: Some Advanced
Recommendations. There are at least seven additional tasks
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that could be initiated at any time that do not depend on the
accomplishment of the primary and intermediate requirements
listed above. They are:
•

Help hemispheric governments to identify and correct key
strategic political, economic, and social shortcomings.

•

Recommend the modernization of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 in accordance with the realities of contemporary
conflict.

•

Recommend repeal of the legal prohibition against U.S.
aid to foreign police.

•

Replace U.S. operationally oriented officers with
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians in designing
and managing indirect and direct security assistance
programs.

•

Help hemispheric governments understand that unless
a regime can exert legitimate control and governance
throughout its entire national territory, there can be no
effective judicial system, rule of law, and human rights;
there can be no effective economic development programs;
and there can be no effective democratic processes.

•

Help hemispheric governments to identify and implement
appropriate military-police-civil actions that will lead to
reestablishing central government control of the “lawless”
areas of a given country.

•

Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to a given
government makes a specific contribution to its strategic
objectives of promoting democracy, human rights,
economic development, social justice, personal and
collective security, and a sustainable peace for the country
and the region.

Conclusions: These recommendations for adapting U.S. military
efforts to the problem of building regional stability and security
cooperation take us beyond doing “something” for something’s
sake. They take us beyond developing budgets, force structure, and
equipment packages for a given crisis situation. They take us beyond
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asking, “What are we going to do?” “Who is going to command and
control the effort?” “How is it to be done?” These imperatives take
us to the development of a mutually agreed-upon strategic vision
(i.e., the political end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us to the
cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and accomplishment
of the objectives (i.e., strategic ends), ways (i.e., strategic courses
of action), and means (i.e., strategic monetary, personnel, and
equipment resources) that directly support the achievement of the
end-game.
Governments not responsive to the importance of these concepts
find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face increasing
social violence, criminal anarchy, and eventual overthrow. Solutions
to these problems take us back to where we began. We return to
Clausewitz’s first dictum: “understand the nature of the conflict on
which you are embarking.” Importantly, solutions to these problems
take us beyond conflict per se. They take us to the wisdom of Sun
Tzu: “Do not advance relying on sheer military power”;14 and “Those
who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and
maintain their laws and institutions. By these means, they make
their governments invincible.”15
Final Issue: The Need to Continue the Momentum from the
Conference and to Build on the Range of Issues Outlined in this
Monograph.
The special status of the United States allows it the opportunity
to facilitate positive change. By accepting this challenge, the United
States can help to replace conflict with cooperation and harvest
the hope and fulfill the promise that regional security cooperation
offers.
Discussion. Within the global security structure, the United
States remains the world’s only superpower. No other nation-state
currently possesses the attributes needed for effective international
and regional leverage―political clout, economic impact, cultural
appeal, and military reach. Still, the United States cannot do
everything alone. There are those allies and friends who can and
will assist the United States in creating a more peaceful and stable
regional and international security environment, given cooperative
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and collegial partnership―and careful end-state planning.16
Example. Should the United States not take these admonitions
seriously, it will find itself in the position of Alice as revealed in her
conversation with the Cheshire Cat:
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk from
here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to get
to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where,” said Alice. “Then it
doesn’t matter which way you walk,” said the Cat. “―so long as I
get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure
to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough!”17

Recommendation to Promulgate a Deliberate Process to
Facilitate the Building of Regional Security Cooperation in
the Western Hemisphere: Establish a multiorganizational (e.g.,
SOUTHCOM, Joint Staff, Army Staff, and War Colleges) “Tiger
Team” to evaluate the recommendations made in this paper―and
elsewhere―and develop a regional security plan of action to expedite
implementation.
Final Note. The sense of urgency and importance of this and
the other recommendations noted in this monograph permeated
the conference discussions of the Colombian crisis as did
acknowledgement of the need for better security cooperation in the
hemisphere. Participants at the Miami conference generally agreed
that Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state having enormous
implications for the prosperity, stability, democracy, and peace of
the entire Western Hemisphere. The illegal drug trafficking and
paramilitary and insurgent organizations (i.e., narco-terrorists)
in that country are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality,
human horror, and internal instability that―if left unchecked at the
strategic level―can ultimately threaten the collapse of the Colombian
state and undermine the political sovereignty of its neighbors. At the
same time, the instability threat constitutes a serious challenge to U.S.
national security, and to the U.S. position in the global community.
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AFTERWORD
Congratulations to those who prepared this report. It was not easy
to reflect in manageable fashion the consensus views of some 300
civilians and military officers from all around the Western Hemisphere,
including such diverse provenances as academia, the private sector,
and nongovernmental organizations, as well as defense establishments.
Nevertheless, this conference was built on the experiences of five
previous major conferences by the same organizers on Western
Hemisphere security issues. It therefore represents a considerable
evolution of thinking on a broad scale. We should not be concerned that
this document may raise more issues and questions than it answers.
That fact demonstrates progress in gaining an understanding of the
very meaning of security in the present-day context.
In an earlier age, and not so long ago, neither the U.S. participants
nor the others from around our Hemisphere would have defined the
issues in all of the manners represented in this report. The traditional
“threats” were external enemies, boundary disputes between states,
and militarism. As this report points out, the “lineal descendents” of
such threats are global terrorists and especially the narcoterrorists who
wreak such havoc and threaten the very existence of even major states
such as Colombia. Yet the fragility of stability and security, as Dr. Max
Manwaring and others have stressed, is now well understood in the
Department of Defense as going well beyond the existence of enemies.
It also emanates from problems of economic, social, and political
development, poverty and disease, the legitimacy of governance, and
environmental degradation, among others.
The good news is that our Hemisphere has come a long way in
approaching these issues in the search for a common vision. The
consensus that the report reflects tracks the views of retired Army
General John R. Galvin when he says that there must be “continuous and
cooperative planning among and between national and international
civilian and military organizations.” That process is not easy to achieve,
but the conference offered hope that this has a better chance than ever
before.
Laying one issue right on the line that came through strongly,
however, was that the continuous and reliable presence of the United
States is essential to the process as the most influential actor. But it
can only be successful if it becomes “more of a partner and less of the
proverbial ‘Colossus of the North,’” as the report argues. Historically,
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there was a time when that happened, as the Franklin Roosevelt
administration in the 1930s announced its Good Neighbor Policy and
formally signed on to the cherished Latin American nonintervention
doctrine. That may explain the overwhelming and immediate support
of most of Latin America for the Allies as World War II began. Of course,
as we know, Roosevelt’s policy was succeeded in Cold War years by the
“paradigm of U.S. political domination, imposition of economic will,
and the threat of military intervention,” which, this conference report
argues, has been unproductive and often unsuccessful.
We get the sense, from this report’s delineation of the issues, that
a combination of U.S. military efficacy and a long-term, broad, and
continuous security dialogue will integrate the Hemisphere into a
genuine common vision, not simply a forced one. The recent successes
of the Uribe administration in Colombia, thanks in large part to the
partnership of the United States, is evidence that progress is possible
even under the most dire conditions. Kidnappings and homicides have
been greatly reduced since last year, nacroterrorists are increasingly
on the run, and President Álvaro Uribe’s popularity rating is at 70
percent. A commitment over time by the U.S. Government now seems
more likely, as the results have become demonstrable. It is never easy
to keep Washington’s attention focused on pressing issues in our own
Hemisphere, however. That will require constant effort.
By the same token, more work is needed to produce successful
cooperative efforts among Western Hemisphere nations to build
genuine regional security cooperation beyond their separate national
interests. The dialogue must be continued. For that reason, the three
organizers of the conference—the Strategic Studies Institute of the
U.S. Army War College, the United States Southern Command, and
the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami
will hold their next conference in early 2004. We hope it will move the
agenda forward and continue to raise consciousness among civil and
military leaders of the issues and recommendations outlined in this
report.

AMBLER MOSS, Director
Dante B. Fascell North-South Center
University of Miami

32

ENDNOTES
1. United States Security Strategy for the Americas, Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Inter-American Affairs, October 2000, p. 11.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and
trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 88-89.
3. Studies that make this point are Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, Colombian
Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional
Stability, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001; and Eduardo Pizarro, “Revolutionary
Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” in Charles Berquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and
Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., Violence In Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical
Perspective, Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992. Additionally, see David C. Jordan,
Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies, Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1999.
4. Jean Larteguy, The Centurions, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1961, pp. 181-182.
5. John LeCarré, The Constant Gardner, New York: Scribner, 2001, p. 137.
6. These assertions are consensus statements based on interviews with senior
Italian Carabinieri officials. The authors are particularly indebted to General Carlo
Alfiero for his guiding remarks. Corroborating information may be found in
Richard Drake, The Aldo Moro Murder Case, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995; Donatella della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy,” in Martha
Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995; and Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of Subversion and
Violence in Contemporary Italy, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987.
7. See, for example, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An
American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972;
Lawrence M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful
Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines―1946-1955, Washington, DC: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1986; Colonel Julius L. Javier, A Study to Determine the
Effectiveness of the Present Counterinsurgency Strategy of the Philippines, Leavenworth,
KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1985; Colonel Venancio R. Duque, Jr.,
The Integrated National Police in Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations: The Great
Difference, Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command & Staff College, 1984; and
Robert Ross Smith, “The Philippines (1946-1954),” in D.M. Condit, et al., Challenge
and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. 1, Washington, DC: The American University,
1968.
8. Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, second edition, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 109.
9. Author interview with General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.) on August 6, 1997,
in Boston, MA. The complete interview is included in the Spring 1998 special issue
of Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No.1.

33

10. Ambassador Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional
Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam, Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, August 1972, pp. ix; 75-84.
11. See, for example, Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion,
Insurgency, Peace-Keeping, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971; Sir Robert
Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, New York: Taplinger, 1970; author
interviews with General Galvin, op. cit; author interviews with Lieutenant General
William G. Carter III, USA (Ret.), on November 30, 1998, and March 2, 1999, in
Washington, DC; author interviews with General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC
(Ret.) on February 9, 2001, and June 22, 2001, in Reston, VA; author interviews
with General Anthony L. Zinni, USMC (Ret.) on June 2, 1999, and October 6, 2000,
in Washington, DC; Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,”
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003, pp. 31-46.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. See also Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310.
14. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University
Press, 1971, p. 122.
15. Ibid., p. 88.
16. Ambassador Myles Frechette, “In Search of the Endgame: A Long-Term
Multilateral Strategy for Colombia,” The North-South AGENDA, February 2003.
17. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, New York:
Grosset & Dunlap, 1982, pp. 66-67.

34

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS
WENDY FONTELA is currently serving as the Deputy Political
Advisor, Special Operations Command. She entered the U.S.
Marine Corps in 1975 after graduating from Southern Connecticut
State College, and was commissioned upon graduation from the
Officer Candidate Course in 1976. Her assignments included the
2nd Force Service Support Group, 2nd Supply Battalion as the
Battalion Supply Officer; the Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station,
Iwakuni, Japan as the Commissary Officer; 2nd Marine Air Wing,
Wing Transportation Squadron; Commanding Officer of the SASSY
Management Unit and 4th Supply Battalion; and as the Marine
Forces Atlantic Supply Officer during Desert Storm. Colonel Fontela
transferred to the United States Marine Corps Reserve in 1980 where
she has served in the 25th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Air Wing,
2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 4th Marine Division, and 4th
Force Service Support Group. She has sat on numerous promotion
boards and served as the President of the Fiscal Year 2000 Staff NonCommissioned Selection Board. Colonel Fontela was a member of
the Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board from 1997-99. Colonel
Fontela has been on active duty since 2000, serving at United States
Southern Command from 2000 to 2003 where she was successively
Deputy Director of Engagement Liaison in support of the Foreign
Liaison Officer program and Commander Conferences, in the
Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate; Command Legislative Affairs
Officer; and Education Coordinator. Colonel Fontela holds a M.A. in
Philosophy from Boston University and a M.A. in Human Resources
Management from Pepperdine University. She graduated from the
Army War College in July 2001 with an M.A. in Strategy.
MARY F. GRIZZARD is currently in the Army G-3 division at
the Pentagon and is an action officer on Latin American issues.
Her previous assignments include instructor in the Department
of Humanities at the University of Florida, Professor in the Latin
American Institute (LAI) at the University of New Mexico in
Albuquerque, as well as a Visiting Professor at the Universidad
Nacional Autómoma de México in Mexico City. In 1990, she was
elected to the office of president of the Latin American Concilium
35

(the faculty body of the LAI) and headed the Partners of the Americas
(New Mexico Chapter). In 1993, Dr. Grizzard was awarded the highly
competitive Foster Fellowship in the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and worked closely on multilateral arms control issues at
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the First Committee
of the UN General Assembly. Upon completion of the fellowship,
she was named Principal Investigator on the Department of Justice
study, examining the effects of the 1995 immigration law changes
on those individuals applying for political asylum. Dr. Grizzard
received her B.A. degree from Rice University and her Ph.D. at the
University of Michigan.
MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S.
Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He has served in
various civilian and military positions at the U.S. Army War College,
the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Dr. Manwaring’s areas of expertise include theory of grand strategy,
U.S. national security policy and strategy, military strategy, military
and nonmilitary operations other than war, political-military affairs,
and Latin America. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of
several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military
affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at War; Gray
Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder; Managing
Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and
Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; and
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S.
in Economics as well as a B.S., M.A., and Ph.D. in Political Science
from the University of Illinois. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army
War College.
DENNIS REMPE is a consultant for an engineering firm. He served
as an infantry officer in the Canadian Armed Forces (Reserve) and
was a member of the Canadian National Team Military Pentathlon.
Mr. Rempe has written numerous articles on counterinsurgency,
intelligence, and foreign international defense, including “Guerrillas,
Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Counterinsurgency Efforts
in Colombia, 1959-65, An American Trojan Horse?”, ”Eisenhower,
36

Latin America, and the Development of U.S. International Security
Policy, 1954-60,” and “The Origin of International Security in
Colombia: Part I, ACIA Special Team Surveys La Violencia, 195960.” Most recently, he completed a chapter entitled “The Information
Challenge in the Global Security Environment” for the forthcoming
Edwin G. Corr, Robert H. Dorff, and Max G. Manwaring edited
volume, The Search for Security: A Forward Strategy for the 21st Century.
He is currently completing “The Origin of International Security
in Colombia: Part II, Containing La Violencia--’Nuts and Bolts’
Counterinsurgency, A CIA Special Team View--1960.” Mr. Rempe is
completing his Ph.D. on U.S.-Colombian internal security issues at
the University of Miami’s School of International Studies.

37

